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When a customer interacts with a firm, extensive personal information often is gathered without the
individual's knowledge. Significant risks are associated with handling this kind of information. Providing
protection may reduce the risk of the loss and misuse of private information, but it imposes some costs on
both the firm and its customers. Nevertheless, customer information security breaches still may occur.
They have several distinguishing characteristics: (1) typically it is hard to quantify monetary damages
related to them; (2) customer information security breaches may be caused by intentional attacks, as well
as through unintentional organizational and customer behaviors; and (3) the frequency of such incidents
typically is low, although they can be very costly when they occur. As a result, predictive models and
explanatory statistical analysis using historical data have not been effective. We present a profit
optimization model for customer information security investments. Our approach is based on value-at-
risk methods and operational risk modeling from financial economics. The main results of this work are that
we: (1) provide guidance on the trade-offs between risk and return in customer information security
investments; (2) define the range of efficient investments in technology-supported risk indemnification
for sellers; (3) model how to handle government-dictated levels of investment versus self-regulation of
investments in technology; and (4) characterize customer information security investment levels when
the firm is able to pass some of its costs on to consumers. We illustrate our theoretical findings with
empirical data from the Open Security Foundation, as a means of grounding our analysis and offering the
reader intuition for the managerial interpretation of our theory and main results. The results show that we
can narrow the decision set for solution providers and policy-makers based on the estimable risks and
losses associated with customer information security. We also discuss the application of our approach in
practice.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The ubiquity of the Internet, the expansion of data storage space,
and revolutionary increases in computing power have enabled
firms to collect and analyze massive amounts of wide-ranging
customer information at very low costs. Extensive personal
information can be gathered either with or without the customer's
knowledge, when the person interacts with a firm. Such informa-
tion is gathered to profile users and provides targeted services, such
as tailored advertisements, discount offers and so on. Significant
risks are associated with handling such private information about
customers, and firms are responsible for the proper treatment of
customers when they use their information. When the firm misuses
customer information or it falls into the hands of other intruders
who misuse it, this may have a significant impact on the firm's
reputation, and also may result in large financial losses. Various
sources [31,38] confirm that the number of customer information
security breaches has been increasing over time, and more and
more individuals are being affected. Firms that collect personal
information from consumers should consider the costs and risks of
customer information privacy protection, and strive to offer
technology solutions and the security policies associated with
them to create effective support.
Customer information security breaches have unique character-
istics. First, it is hard to quantify the monetary damages that may be
involved, even though the severity of the information security breach
may be perceived to be high. Firms that suffer from information
security breaches face the prospect of customer losses, reputational
problems, and fines, while the contingent liabilities often lead to the
downgrading of the firm's stock value [12,16]. Some of the losses may
occur over the long term, and, thus, recovery also will take time. The
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long-term effects also may make it difficult to estimate the related
monetary damages accurately. Second, unlike other security intru-
sions,1 the cause of customer information security breaches may arise
due to intentional attacks, as well as unintentional organizational and
individual behaviors. The Open Security Foundation [31] has reported
that about a half of past information security breaches are due to
intentional attacks such as hacking, while accidents under normal
operations, such as lost or stolen computers and documents, account
for the rest. This wide range of causes makes it hard for a firm to
establish effective information security strategy; technical and non-
technical means of protection mechanisms are necessary, but may not
be easy to implement effectively. Last, although the total number of
customer information security breaches has increased over time in
the economy, the frequency of such incidents is still low for individual
firms. Moreover, there is not much historical data that is publicly
available (in part because firms often do not wish to make their
information security issues public knowledge), so statistical analysis
of historical data is not very feasible.
Since such information security breaches may have a significant
negative financial impact, many firms now deploy technology and
security policy-based safeguards to protect their customers' private
information to prevent becoming victims of such breaches [27]. A firm
may implement several information security methods to its custo-
mers to reduce the risk of information security breaches. They include
software and hardware solutions known as privacy-enhancing
technologies and other non-technical information security policies.
Examples of software protection methods include intrusion detection
add-ons, encryption software, secure socket-layer connections,
public-key infrastructure, and anti-virus software. Random-number
generators, smart cards and fingerprint readers are examples of
hardware solutions for privacy protection. Besides such software and
hardware solutions, firms also offer other means of information
security to their customers. Examples of non-technical means include
providing opt-out choices while collecting personal information,
conducting transactions through third-party payment systems such as
PayPal or Google Checkout, and using one-time auto-generated credit
card numbers that are not linked to personal information. A firm can
choose to hire staff to manage use of customer privacy information,
too, with a chief privacy officer leading the effort.
Firms face the risks of improper access to, errors with, and theft of
their customers' personal information [40]. As a firm invests more in
information security, such riskswill likely be reduced. However, due to
the unforeseen nature of such risks, they may not be controlled
completely, even if a firm implements all of the possible technological
and security policy protections. Moreover, the firm may not choose to
use all of these methods due to customer preferences and incompat-
ible environments, and due to concerns about profit maximization [2].
Previous research suggests that some customers are sensitive about
information security, but others are less concerned [8]. Different
computing environments also prevent customers from adopting all of
the possible methods of protection. Some methods require high-
powered computing with advanced technology, some are dependent
on the operating systems that customers have implemented, and some
require nearly expert knowledge of computing.
Therefore, it is important for a firm to understand the factors
affecting the value of its decision to invest in information security.
Public policy and regulatory studies have identified several external
factors that affect information security strategy [12,26,39]. Govern-
ment regulations and self-regulations are key components that affect
an organization's information security strategy [11]. Privacy concerns
now have become a major obstacle to attracting customers to e-
commerce [19]. However, Hui et al. [21] suggest that the consumers
are not fully cautious about sharing their personal information with
online merchants even though they are concerned about privacy.
Studies by Ashrafi and Kuilboer [2] and Schwaig et al. [39] have
revealed that firms selectively adopt the available information
security mechanisms based on their own competitive circumstances.
Prior research has overlooked the need to understand customer
privacy protection more fully in economic terms though. Generally,
although firms should respect their customers' rights for information
privacy, economic theory predicts that it may not be optimal for a firm
to protect them fully—whichmay be truly unfortunate in some cases.
Providing protectionmethods for customersmay reduce the risk of
misuse or the loss of private information, but at the same time, it will
impose some costs on the firm, as well as on its customers. Some
protectionmethods involve direct costs to customers. One is the use of
hardware solutions that may require users to purchase technology to
access services securely. An example is PayPal, which sells a small
keychain device – a security fob – that provides a frequently-updated
login code that enables the validation of a user's login, and blocks
password phishing [36]. Other solutions may not involve direct
monetary costs to customers, but some indirect costs may occur. The
required time and installation effort, the learning costs for use, and the
costs of dealing with malfunctions of software solutions are examples
of such indirect costs. Customers' perceptions about the value of
information security may vary too. So customers may choose to use
protection services to different degrees, depending on howmuch they
value privacy and how much the services cost.
Firms, on the other hand, incur implementation costs to provide
customer information security. Although the result ofmishandlingprivate
information canbe costly,mostfirmswill choose to implement only some
of the available customer information security protections. In most cases,
implementing all of the available protections will be prohibitively
expensive. So firms must balance the costs and risks associated with
customer information security breaches against the investment required
to find a profit-maximizing level of privacy protection.
We will answer the following questions: What are the value-
maximizing investment options forfirms to protect customer information
security? What are the factors that drive firms to invest in information
security protection? How canwe identify which investment level choices
are optimal? We develop a profit optimization model for information
security technology investments that considers the risks associated with
implementation. We use a profit-at-risk approach based on value-at-risk
methods, andoperational riskmodeling fromfinancial economics.Weshow
that the optimal investment choice is based on the control and expected
mitigation of risks due to implementing information security technology
solutions, and is affected by other concerns as well. We also provide
model-based evidence as to why firmsmay not choose to implement full
protection for their customers, and related empirical evidence of the
model findings.
2. Literature review
Various studies on consumer information privacy have identified
several factors that are likely to affect the privacy strategy of an
organization. We classify such studies according to three different
stakeholders with information privacy interests. Individuals provide
their personal information to a number of organizations (businesses,
1 We define information security in terms of the broader concept of information
privacy. Information privacy issues arise whenever data are exchanged or processed,
and are explicitly related to individuals. They also typically are a matter of the law and
business ethics. Information security issues, in contrast, deal with the loss, theft, and
unauthorized use of data in information systems [32], and are typically matters that
are operational, financial and managerial in nature. Information security issues also
arise with respect to sensitive data that do not constitute sensitive personal
information. Although security is required to achieve privacy, information security
emphasizes protection mechanisms involving technological and non-technological
solutions. We focus on protecting a consumer's information security, which is also a
subset of information privacy issues. Protecting a firm's operational data is solely an
information security issue; implementing authentication methods to protect a
customer's bank account information, for example, may be an information privacy
issue, as well as an information security issue.
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non-profits, and government agencies) that not only use such
information themselves but often share it with other organizations.
Standard-setters and regulatory agencies prescribe how organizations
must protect the personal information they collect from individuals
and may impose limits on its subsequent dissemination. Each
stakeholder affects an organization's privacy strategy either directly
or indirectly. Table 1 summarizes the main thrust of the literature
based on the role of each stakeholder in an organization's customer
information security strategy.
2.1. The privacy concerns of individuals
The nature of the relationship among privacy concerns, risk percep-
tions, and trust remains unclear. Some studies have shown that privacy
concerns increase risk perceptions [35,44], but others have found that the
riskiness of divulging personal information increases privacy concerns
[13]. Similarly, there is evidence that privacy concerns reduce trust [28],
but also evidence that trust decreases concerns about privacy [35].
Evidence about the effects of privacy concerns on actual behavior
has been mixed. Milne et al. [30] have indicated that privacy concerns
predict self-reported levels of engaging in privacy-protecting beha-
viors. Pavlou et al. [35] showed that increased concerns about privacy
are negatively related to online purchasing behavior. Risk perceptions
appear to affect intent to provide personal information [3,13,28] and
willingness to transact with e-retailers negatively [44]. Perceived risk
also reduces trust [13], which is important because trust is positively
related not only to intent to share personal information [44], but also
to the actual sharing of such informationwith an onlinemerchant [17]
and purchase behavior [44].
2.2. Organizational cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment
Some studies have also focused on the direct economic and
financial effects on the firm resulting from privacy violations [1,6].
Contrary to other problems where the value of information is well
defined, the value of protecting against customer information loss is
difficult to quantify [1]. Nevertheless, losses from information security
breaches can be potentially significant and their recovery may require
an unspecified length of time [7].
Risk management studies analyze costs and benefits for privacy
strategies. Gordon and Loeb [17] use an economicmodel to determine
the optimal investment required to protect a firm's information. They
report two key results. They show that optimal investment decision-
making should focus on protecting information assets withmid-range
vulnerability, since the protection of highly-vulnerable information is
so expensive. Second, they offer evidence that it never pays to invest
to protect information completely; instead, maintaining some
vulnerability is optimal. Hoo [20] formulates a similar decision
analysis approach to provide evidence for the value of different
information security safeguards based on the annual loss expectancy
value, in the presence of perfect and imperfect information on loss-
generating events.
2.3. Standard-setters and regulatory agencies
Several external forces regulate organizations' use of private
information. The U.S. Privacy Act of 1974 documented what
constitutes Fair Information Practices, which are widely recognized
and used for self-regulation in the United States [11]. They offer
guidelines for firms' self-regulation practices, as well as for the role of
governmental legislation [14]. The Fair Information Practices also
provide guidelines for a firm to control access to the private
information of its customers. However, U.S. legislation has maintained
a patchwork approach that is fragmented and discontinuous, and
usually targets specific sectors or prevents specific abuses.
Little support has been found to support the assertion that
regulation increases compliance with policies [9]. These findings
suggest that self-regulatory efforts have been largely ineffective.
Ashrafi and Kuilboer [2] examined the way privacy is treated in the
context of the Fair Information Practices. They surveyed 500
companies in the U.S., and found that retailers and travel agencies
have been complying fairly well with the principles. However, they
also reported that few firms spend enough resources on privacy
protection so that their compliance would be viewed as “full.”
The presence of government regulation does not exclude self-
regulation. However, self-regulation lacks enforcement mechanisms
and sanctions. Research indicates that full compliance with such
guidelines doesn't always happen [2,37]. Schwaig et al. [39] found that
firms in different industries use different information practices that
are considered fair, even though they may not address information
privacy and information security in the same ways. The sensitivity of
consumer information also differs by industry. As a result, some
industries are subject to government regulations, as is the case with
individual information privacy in healthcare and education, which
makes managing stakeholders' privacy especially challenging.
3. Theory
We next discuss operational risk and a profit-at-risk approach
based on value-at-risk theory from financial economics.
Table 1
Major stakeholders with information security interests.
Stakeholders Factors Citations Findings
Individuals Privacy concerns
Risk perceptions
Trust
Awad and Krishnan [3]
Dinev and Hart [13]
Hui et al. [21]
Malhotra et al. [28]
Pavlou et al. [35]
Van Slyke et al. [44]
The nature of the relationship between privacy concerns, risk perceptions, and trust
remains unclear. Evidence about the effect of privacy concerns on actual behavior has
been mixed.
Organizations Cost-benefit analysis
Risk assessment
Acquisti et al. [1]
Cavusoglu et al. [6]
Crothers [7]
Gordon and Loeb [17]
Hoo [20]
The value of protecting against customer information loss is difficult to quantify.
Optimal investment decision-making should focus on protecting information assets
with “mid-range” vulnerability. Maintaining some vulnerability is optimal.
Standard-setters and
regulatory agencies
Regulations
Guidelines
Ashrafi and Kuilboer [2]
Culnan [9]
Culnan and Bies [11]
PriceWaterhouseCoopers [37]
Schwaig et al. [39]
Little evidence has been found to support the idea that regulation increases compliance
with policies. Some industries are subject to government regulations (e.g., HIPAA for
healthcare), which makes managing privacy challenging.
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3.1. Operational risk and value-at-risk
Operational risk is the risk of monetary loss due to inadequate or
failed internal processes, people and systems, or from external events
[4]. Operational risk is often assessed in the financial services industry,
though the term is generic and can be applied to any other industry
[34]. Unlike other types of risk, where firmsmay seek out risk to create
the basis for subsequent reward, operational risk originates at the
business process level and only generates financial losses [23]. Thus,
managing to identify and eliminate sources of risk is important. Losses
due to the risks associated with the firm's choices about its customer
information security practices can be classified as an operational risk.
The issues arise from an inadequate handling of private information
(the misuse or unauthorized access to the information, ineffective
privacy policy, and the loss of equipment and documents), or an
external attack. Frequency and severity of financial losses associated
with information security breaches are two key factors that are used
to measure the losses due to operational risk, according to Jorion [23].
Typically, the occurrence of such events is infrequent, but sometimes
their impacts may be severe to the extent that it may cause a firm to
become bankrupt. Moreover, recovery may be timely and costly, and
may also require radical changes in the organization's business
processes and operations.
Jorion [23] suggested using value-at-risk methods to model the
operational risk in the financial services industry. Value-at-risk
methods are widely used in finance to model market and credit
risks also. They estimate the maximum loss in a financial portfolio
with a given level of confidence. Value-at-risk methods have been
applied in financial services to evaluate asset portfolios in the
presence of risk factors as well. The method provides comprehensive
risk measurement and can deal with risks from any sources. Unlike
conventional financial forecasts that only consider point estimates of
the most likely cases, value-at-risk provides the worst-case scenario
for a given level of confidence that managers determine is
appropriate. Such worst-case scenarios can identify the range of
expected loss values considering the risk. Thus, a financial manager
can have a better idea of the trade-offs between the risk and the
expected value of the portfolio.
Value-at-risk is typically calculated for a single time period to
gauge the likelihood of loss at the 95% or 99% confidence level [5]. The
confidence level of 95% indicates that, on average, there is a 95% chance
of the expected loss of an asset being lower than the value-at-risk
value that is calculated. Risk in a value-at-risk model is represented by
the volatility of the underlying costs or revenues and the resulting
expected value outcome. It is expressed using the standard deviation.
This permits the minimum and maximum possible values of the
portfolio in the presence of risk to be estimated.
Jorion [23] described the computation of value-at-risk of a
portfolio in five steps. First, the analyst estimates the current mark-
to-market (MTM) value of the portfolio in dollar terms (e.g.,
$100 million). Second, she measures the variability of the portfolio
value by establishing the risk factor r (e.g., 15% per annum). In
financial market operations, this is typically done on the basis of
observations of market value over time. For many operational
settings, the risk factor must be estimated, since no historical
information will be available, or it will be prohibitively expensive to
capture. Third, the analyst selects a time horizon or the holding period
t for the analysis (e.g., 10 days, annualized based on the assumption of
252 trading days in a year, so t=10/252).2 Fourth, she sets the
confidence level α (e.g., 99%), which yields a confidence coefficient c
of 2.33, assuming a normal distribution of potential losses. Last, she
reports the worst potential loss by processing all the preceding
information into a probability distribution of revenues, which is
summarized by the VaRmeasure. This can be stated, for example, as a
portfolio value of $7 million at the 99% confidence level, as follows:
VaR = MTM⋅r⋅
ffiffi
t
p
⋅c = $100;000;000⋅15%⋅
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
10
252
r
⋅2:33 = $7;000;000
ð1Þ
In Eq. (1), $7 million represents the value of the current portfolio
in the worst-case scenario, with a confidence level of 99%, while the
MTM value of $100 million is the maximum expected value of the
portfolio. In practice, one can expect the value to be somewhere
between $7 million to $100 million. This enables management to
plan an investment strategy that is sensitive to assumptions about
risk.
Wang et al. [45] built a model of information security investments
and showed how a firm can evaluate different investment trade-offs
based on value-at-risk analysis. They provide simulation results based
on historical data and managerial estimations of the costs associated
with an information security breach. In addition, Paleologo [33]
applied value-at-risk methods in the context of pricing IT services on
demand and introduced the price-at-risk approach to address
uncertainty in services pricing decisions. He argues that the price-
at-risk approach improves on traditional cost-plus pricing methods.
Kauffman and Sougstad [24] extended the price-at-risk methodology
in the context of information technology (IT) service contract design,
and introduced the concept of profit-at-risk, the maximum expected
profit that can be achieved in the presence of risk.
We apply a similar construct, price-at-risk from Kauffman and
Sougstad [24], for estimating the maximum expected profit that a firm
can earn fromcustomer information security protection, in thepresence
of the risk of the misuse of customers' personal information. They
focused on pricing IT service contracts together in a portfolio, and on
optimizing profit in the presence of uncertainty. Our methodology
extends the idea of the set of services as a portfolio. However, we will
focus onmodeling optimal investment decision-making for information
security investments in the presence of the risk of information security
breach incidents and external regulatory actions.
4. Model development
We next introduce a model that can be used to value information
security technology solution investment decisions. Our model utilizes a
risk management modeling technique suggested by Jorion [23]. Through
its use, we are able to evaluate the risk associated with customer
information security breaches, based on the idea of profit-at-risk.
4.1. Model parameters and assumptions
Ourmodel's parameters are defined in Table 2.We assume that the
firm offers a chosen mix of information security protection services or
technology investment from a known pool of such opportunities.
Customers prefer to transact with firms that implement effective
means to protect the privacy of their personal information. Likewise,
the firm will select an information security level, subject to a pre-set
level of risk which it may need to endure, to maintain an acceptable
level of profitability. In effect, its aim is to protect itself against
disabling financial losses.
4.1.1. Information security level S
In our model, we will assume that there are a number of
information security and protection methods available. The infor-
mation security level S that a firm chooses to implement can be
2 Risk is measured by the standard deviation of unexpected outcomes. The mean, or
expected return, and the variance increase linearly with time. The risk, represented by
the standard deviation, grows with the square root of time, however. It is assumed that
the returns follow a random walk, and are uncorrelated over time. Thus, adjustments of
risk for different time horizons can be based on a factor involving the square root of
time. All parameters are measured on an annualized basis.
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thought of as being continuous from a low percentage to a high
percentage of security, or 0≤S≤1.3 The firm chooses a security
level S=1 when it provides information security as much as
possible, based on current methods of information security
auditing. An information security level S=0 implies no spending
on services or technologies to protect customer information
security. The customer should not expect full protection; there is
likely to be some opportunity for security breaches that will
compromise a customer's personal information.
Kauffman and Sougstad [24] demonstrated an approach that is
useful in this context. They employed a profit-at-risk constraint in their
analysis of IT service contracts. Their methodology considers the
lowest acceptable level of profit within a given confidence level over a
given time period. We view the managerial problem for protecting
customer information security in terms of a portfolio of financial
assets, which makes it amenable to analysis with value-at-risk
methods. We consider the set of information security services as a
portfolio that a firm can build. Information security level S, this way,
represents the proportion of information security services chosen
among the possible protection services.
4.1.2. Revenue R
Weassume that a firm cannot price its products or services differently
based on the total costs of providing a given level of protection to its
customer. Implicit in this assumption is that consumerswill be indifferent
to information security protection and the reparations thefirmpays out in
terms of legal settlements or other approaches to restore value. Themore
customer information security the firm invests in, the more the costs of
implementationwill be,while revenueRwill be roughly constant. In other
words, the revenues associated with high-variance expected losses from
less complete information security will be the same as those for the
revenues with lower-variance losses associated with more complete
information security protection.4When afirmprovidesmore information
security, its transactions will be less risky from its customers' point of
view, but the firm's costs will increase as information security becomes
more complete.
4.1.3. Implementation costs C(S) and estimated losses λ(S)
Weassume total costs areof two types: implementation costsC(S) and
the severity of estimated losses λ(S) at a given confidence level associated
with information security breaches that permit customer information to
beexploited.Weuse thewords estimated losses forfinancial lossesdirectly
associatedwith the firm's legal obligations and remediationmeasures for
restoring information security, as well as any estimated indirect costs,
suchas loss in reputation and trust. Implementation costs are costs related
to development and deployment of the services to provide information
security to customers, and are not subject to uncertainty. Instead,
implementation costs tend to be known by the firm, so it is more a
matter of whether they choose to incur them, and how much they will
spend. We also assume that implementation costs are increasing as S
increases.
We also expect that the customer information security spending is
subject to variance in its capacity to provide effective protection. Consider
an e-commerce transaction. From accepting an order from a customer to
the final delivery, a firm faces a number of potentially harmful outcomes
with respect to the use of its customers' information that need to be dealt
with to thwart their occurrence. Although there are no certain outcomes
in financial transactions, it may be possible for the firm's managers to
estimate the extent of the financial losses that may occur with different
levels of probability.
We assume that the probability distribution of losses at any level of S
has “fat tails,”whichmeans the probability of a very large loss occurring is
low, but still non-zero. As S increases though, the probability of loss
decreases, so the probability distribution will shrink toward 0. The
maximum loss at a given confidence level is represented as a deviation
Table 2
Modeling notation and definitions.
Notation Description
S A proportion defining the information security protection level
with 0≤S≤1, and S=0 indicating no protection and S=1
indicating full protection.
R Firm revenue in the presence of choices about information
security investments. RPassOn indicates firm revenue in the
presence of choices about information security investments,
inclusive of the recovery of their costs from customers in the form
of a higher price that the firm passes on.
π Profit, based on firm revenue, reduced by information security
implementation costs and customer information-related
expected losses when a security breach occurs.
PaR Value of profit-at-risk; the minimum expected profit at a given
confidence level.
α Confidence interval for profit-at-risk.
C(S) Overall implementation cost (purchase plus deployment) to
provide the level of information security protection S.
x, E[x] Loss severity x stated in financial loss terms for the firm when
an information security breach event occurs; and the expected
value of the same.
n, E[n] Frequency of information security breaches in period t; and its
expected value.
z, E[z] Observed total financial losses in a period considering the
expected loss severity and the expected security breach
frequency; and expected total financial losses.
g(x) Probability distribution function for customer information
security breach-related losses related to an information
security breach event x.
.f(n) Probability distribution function for customer information
security breach frequency n.
h(z) Probability distribution function of total financial losses
considering both the frequency and the loss severity of
information security breaches, h(z)=h(f(n), g(x)).
λ(S) Expected total financial losses for information security
protection level S, with λ(S)=E[z].
z(S, α) Total financial losses z for information security protection level
S at confidence level α.
t Period when information security technology investment is to
occur.a
k Minimum targeted profit at a given confidence level for period t.
S^ Information security protection level that yields maximum
profit, S^=argmax(π).
S⁎ Information security protection level that yields maximum
PaR, S⁎=argmax(PaR).
SelfReg, GovReg,
UnderEst, PassOn
Indicators for self-regulation, government regulation, under-
estimation of risk, and pass-on of implementation costs for
information security.
Note: We use the notation PaRwhen we refer to modeling values in our analysis of this
problem, and reserve the term profit-at-risk for the higher-level concept and the
methodology.
a In the baseline case, we assume that the time horizon will be one year. Thus, we use
t=1 for our examples. However, depending on the actual data set and its time horizon,
one can adjust t accordingly.
3 In reality, each information security method in the known pool of services and
privacy-enhancing technology investments may not be weighted equally. The cost of
implementation and the reduced risk associated with the approaches will be different.
Thus, S should not be considered as the number of services implemented or the
expenditures on information security technologies. Rather, it should be considered as the
level of information security achieved from these things. It is reasonable to assume that
there is an implementation sequence representing a best-known approach among
those that most firms follow in practice. So we expect that most firms will choose to
implement information security services in a sequence that they think is logical. This
helps to ensure that one firm's information security level is the same as another firm's
information security level when they both invest in the same proportional protection.
4 We acknowledge that more information security protection provided to customers
ought to increase their trust and the firm's reputation. Also, more trust and reputation
will generally have a positive effect on customer demand [25], but not if delivering
these costs them more. To obtain our initial results though, we only require that the
revenue function be non-decreasing in the level of investment in information security
S and be concave.
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from the expected loss. Fig. 1 shows the probability distribution of losses
for no protection (S=0), and at full protection (S=1).
With the profit-at-risk approach, we focus on the occurrence of an
extreme loss, themaximum loss that occurs at a given confidence level.
The two right vertical lines in Fig. 1 represent the maximum loss at
95% confidence on the probability distribution, marked by Points C
and D at S=0 and S=1. In conventional approaches to profitability
analysis, only the expected values would be considered. Thus, if we
only consider revenue in an expected sense, without considering the
distribution of losses, then the case of no information security (S=0)
will always be preferred, as the immediate costs will be the least. Of
course, this breaks down as soon as information security breach-
driven losses are considered, and so our recommendation is to
consider revenues and costs in a more sophisticated manner.
4.1.4. Frequency, severity and variance
The operational risk modeling literature [23,34] suggests two
parameters that are useful in modeling losses due to operational risk.
Frequency is the number of information security breaches that occurs
in period t, and loss severity is a measure of the size of the related
financial loss that occurs. One can derive a probability distribution
function of total losses based on the frequency and loss severity
distributions, as we will shortly show. In practice, historical data from
an organization's own information security breaches or relevant
others in a similar industry can be used to derive the necessary
information to support figuring these things out. The risk of total
financial losses associated with customer information security
breaches and the related misuse of customers' personal information
are associated with investments made by the firm to protect
information security. This is what the firm will face when it is not
able to protect its customers' information security fully.
Consider the following elements that wewill use to construct amodel
for information security technology investment choices. First, let f(n) be
the probability distribution function for the frequency n≥0 of customer
information security breaches during a period of time t. Next, define g(x)
as the probability distribution function for the severity of the financial
losses x (x≥0), specified in termsof thedollar amount of losses, that occur
as a result of a customer information security breach. It is reasonable to
assume that f(n) is decreasing in n, so that information security breaches
are less likely to occur with an increasingly high rate of frequency than
witha lowrateof frequency inaperiod. Similarly, g(x) is alsodecreasing in
x, so thathigher-severity,higherdollar-loss customer information security
breaches are less likely to occur than lower-severity, lower dollar-loss
incidents. Assuming that the distributions of information security breach-
related frequencyn and severity x are independent, the expected total loss
E[z] in period t will be a function of the random loss severity x over a
random number of breaches n.
For example, suppose that in a representative period t, a firm faces
the risk of a customer information security breach. The firm's
probability distribution for breach frequency and loss severity are
represented in Tables 3a and 3b. This information permits a manager
to compute the expected frequency of an information security breach
as E[n]=0.5 and the expected loss severity as E[x]=$23,500 for
period t. Assuming that breach frequency and loss severity are
independent, the expected total financial loss within the period will be
the product of the expected breach frequency and loss severity, which is E
[n]⋅E[x]=0.5⋅$23,500 in this example. More generally, the probability
distribution function of total financial losses that occur in period t due to the
joint effects of breach frequency and breach-related loss severity can be
writtenash(z)=h(g(x), f(n)).5 Sinceg(x) and f(n) arebothdecreasing in x
and n, h(z) also will be decreasing in z, which represents the possible
combinations of x and n weighted by the likelihood of their joint
occurrence. Note that z also is a function of investments in information
security, S. This permits us to write expected total financial losses as
λ(S)=E[z], reflecting the benefits that S will create by reducing the loss
severity of information security breaches, as well as their frequency.
We assume that the expected total losses will decrease in S, so dλ/
dSb0. This is a reasonable assumption: there is no incentive for a firm to
invest in information security protection if it increases expected financial
losses. For the illustrations that we will offer hereafter in this article, we
assume that the diminution in expected losses decreases in S, and the
marginal benefit from investing inmore information security decreases as
Fig. 1. Probability distribution of financial losses.
5 To calculate the expected value of total loss out of frequency and severity
distribution, computing the product of the expected values of breach frequency and
loss severity is sufficient. However, in order to derive value-at-risk, we need to recover
the full distribution [23]. To derive the probability distribution function of h(z), it is
necessary to recognize that it is based on two independent distribution functions, g(x)
and f(n), which can be estimated in practice with a variety of forecasting and control
methods. The simplest way to construct the total loss severity distribution is by
tabulating all of the possible combinations of frequency and loss severity that are
identified. This should not be too onerous a task in practice, since only a limited set of
outcome probabilities will need to be assessed for severity and frequency.
Alternatively, one can also derive the h(z) distribution by fitting the probability
distribution functions for the loss frequency and the loss severity from a known
parametric distribution. For the modeling we do in this research, we do not require
any specific form of the loss severity distribution in our model, so long as the
distributional assumption that h(z) is decreasing in S. For additional discussion of
these issues, the interested reader should see Jorion [23].
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well. 6 So, beyond some point, adding more protection will not improve
the level of security for customer information very much, if at all. Also,
since we have assumed fixed revenues for the firm at any level of S, total
cost is the only factor that will affect its profit.
The distribution of total costs also should become narrower as S
increases. Fig. 1 (presented earlier) shows a probability distribution
function for S=0, with risk depicted as the distance between the
expected loss (Point B) and the maximum loss at the 95% confidence
level (Point D). We see that this distance is wider than in the case of
maximum protection (S=1, Points A and C). So, even though profit is
decreasing in S, PaR is affected by the information security invest-
ments made to reduce risk. We further note that the profit associated
with the average value of total costs is always greater than profit-at-
risk when the maximum loss is considered at a given confidence level
for any value of S, with 0≤S≤1.
Fig. 2 shows implementation costs, expected total losses and total
costs for the information security protection interval 0≤S≤1. We
assume that increases in S are likely to reduce the frequency and
severity of the financial losses (or both), and so f(n) or g(x) (or both
again) will decrease as S increases. We further expect that the
distribution of total financial losses due to information security
breaches in a period, h(z), will follow an exponential distribution with
parameters for information security breach frequency and loss
severity. The function λ(S) denotes the expected losses z in the
presence of information security protection S. Similarly, z(S, α)
denotes the total loss severity for information security protection
level S at a given confidence level α, which describes the worst case
scenario (VaR).
Expected losses, λ(S), for a given level of severity for customer
information breach-induced financial losses and the associated
extreme losses, z(S, α), will be decreasing in S and convex. The total
costs are subject to the interaction between the expected losses and
implementation costs. With a continuous and convex total cost
function, the profit function will be continuous and concave. From
this, we can derive the profit-maximizing information security
investment level S. The first-order condition is −dC(S)/dS−dλ(S)/
dS=0; profit will be at a maximum when the marginal cost of
implementation is equal to the marginal diminution in expected
financial losses.
4.2. The baseline model
Recent information security breaches reveal that the payoffs for
customer information security investments can be large. Once an
information security breach occurs, a firm is exposed to direct costs
for investigating its customer's personal information losses and
advising its customers about the breach. A firm may also face indirect
costs for settlements and legal actions that will need to be dealt with
later. Also, loss of trust and reputation is hard to restore without
enduring additional costs. Thus, even though the probability may be
low, customer information security breaches are perceived to be very
risky in organizations across many different industries. Our informa-
tion security technology investment decision-making model, repre-
senting this setting, is formulated as follows:
Max π= R–C Sð Þ–λ Sð Þ
s:t:PaR = R–C Sð Þ–z S;αð Þ ffiffitp ≥k 0≤S≤1ð Þ; ð2Þ
where λ(S) is the expected total losses considering the frequency and
severity of customer information security breaches in period t, and z
(S, α) represents the extreme losses associated with the confidence
level α, considering the extent of the information security protection
investments that are made by the firm. We also assume that the firm
will only consider positive expected profit, where RNC(S), and thus
will have no incentive to invest when costs exceed revenues.
Moreover, we assume that the firm will prefer the highest minimum
profit level at a given confidence level. Thus, it will prefer more over less
profit-at-risk.
Next, consider the PaR function in Fig. 3.
The PaR function is concave since the maximum total costs at a
given confidence level in Fig. 2 are convex and continuous. By
definition, z(S, α)Nλ(S) at any point in S, and, thus, PaR(S)bπ(S) holds
for all S. At point Sˆ, where PaR is maximized, dπ(Sˆ)/dSˆb0. Thus, the
point of maximum service level, PaR(Sˆ), will be greater than the
profit-maximizing value S⁎:
PaR Sˆ
 
bπ S  ð3Þ
4.3. Inefficient and efficient information security levels
We next offer two propositions that enable us to characterize the
efficiency of information security associated with a given information
security protection technology choice. We distinguish between the
inefficient protection interval and the efficient protection level, as
follows:
• Proposition 1 (Inefficient protection interval). When (dπ/dS) /
(dPaR/dS)N0, there is always a better customer information security
investment choice available that will maximize profit and profit-at-
risk. This is the inefficient protection interval.
• Proposition 2 (Efficient protection interval). When (dπ/dS) /
(dPaR/dS)b0, so that profit is decreasing while PaR is increasing,
investments in customer information security at level S are subject to
tradeoffs between profit and risk. We define this interval as the
efficient protection interval.
For the proofs of these and all of the other propositions in this
article, see Appendix 1.
A firm will not choose to invest in information security in the
interval 0≤SbS⁎ in Fig. 3, as it does not satisfy profit-maximizing
strategy of the firm; both profit and profit-at-risk are increasing in the
interval. So, investments in information security in this interval are
inefficient: there is always a better investment level S that yields more
profit with less risk. This is similar to the idea of an efficient frontier in
portfolio management for financial assets. Similarly, SˆbS≤1 is
inefficient; both profit and profit-at-risk are decreasing in this
interval. Thus, the information security investment level S clearly
matters in terms of efficiency. In the interval of S⁎≤S≤Sˆ, a firm may
Table 3
Sample security breach frequency and loss severity probability distribution.
(a) Breach frequency distribution (b) Loss severity distribution
Breach frequency (n) Probability Loss severity (x) Probability
0 60% $1,000 50%
1 30% $10,000 30%
2 10% $100,000 20%
Note: The expected value of an
information security breach
is 0.5 times per period.
Note: The expected value of the
typical security breach-related loss
severity is $23,500.
6 We assume that the rate of diminution of expected losses associated with
investment in information security technology initially will be positive and increasing
(d2λ/dS2N0), but then after some point (d2λ/dS2=0) the gains will tail off (d2λ/
dS2b0). When the rate of diminution in expected returns is positive (d2λ/dS2N0), the
marginal total costs will always be increasing. So, marginal profit will always decrease
in this interval. However, in the interval where the marginal benefit from investing in
more information security decreases, marginal total costs also will always decrease,
and so we can expect maximum profit to occur within this interval. We will only focus
on the interval in which the diminution in expected losses decreases in S.
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choose more profit with more risk S⁎, or less profit with less risk Sˆ, or
position its investment somewhere in the middle, so S⁎bSbSˆ.
4.4. Illustrative example
We next provide a numerical example to ground our model and
provide additional insights to the reader. Consider a business-to-
consumer e-commerce firm in the retail industry. It faces two customer
information security investment choices to indemnify against fraudulent
access to customer information. A prime example of a fraud event for this
kind of firm is unauthorized access to customer or employee records that
leads to subsequent misuse of personal information. Recent examples of
such private information breaches include Capital One, Nationwide
Financial and Alaska Air Group [31].
The first investment the firm considers is a set of system-wide
controls that will reduce the expected probability of a customer
information security breach. The second alternative involves parsing
customer databases, so that no more than one million records can
ever be compromised on a given day. The second of these two
investment choices is likely to result in a change in the financial loss
distribution for a security breach in our model. We further assume
that these two investments are mutually exclusive, and that the firm
is interested in a three-month (one quarter) time horizon for the
computation of value-at-risk.
The Web site of the Open Security Foundation (www.dataloss.org) is
the source of sample data for our simulation. These data have limitations
with their reporting intervals, granularity and completeness. Neverthe-
less, it is helpful for supporting an illustrative example. We selected data
from June 1, 2008 to June 1, 2010, representing two years of customer
information security breaches. The Open Security Foundation coded the
events as “fraud breaches,”marked as “Fraud-SE” on the Web site. Fig. 4
shows the actual distribution of information security-related losses that
occurred, basedonacross of thenumberof customerdata records lost and
the frequency of occurrence of a customer information security break.
Fig. 3. Profit and PaR for 0≤S≤1.
Fig. 2. Implementation costs and financial losses, 0≤S≤1.
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Note that the distribution is highly skewed, with a mean loss of 37,507
records per security breach, but a median loss of only seventy records for
each event.
We can approximate the financial losses associated with the
number of customer records that have been compromised in a
security breach based on a linear mapping. This is a simplification, of
course. Indeed, it is very likely that the relationship between the
number of customer records that have been accessed and the dollar
value of the losses is not linear. Still, this captures the essential impact
of the distribution of losses. For our illustration, we will assume a
baseline likelihood of 10% for one information security breach over a
three-month period that involves some number of customer data
records which, in turn, can be tied to some level of severity of financial
loss. Although this may seem like a high likelihood, the Open Security
Foundation data surprisingly indicate that there was a 64% chance of
an information security breach across the reporting firms in a similar
time period. If we further assume that our hypothetical firm has a
significant market presence, then 10% is a reasonable likelihood for
the occurrence of a customer information security breach.
We constructed our simulation results on the basis of outcomes that
occurred in 1,000 simulatedquarters. Table 4 shows the expected loss and
value-at-risk (based on the maximum loss that might occur at a 98%
confidence level). It also shows the profit-at-risk (PaR) for each scenario.
We assume that the revenue level from client Web interactions with the
firm in its normal business will be unaffected at $5,000,000, regardless of
the customer information security investment choice the firmmakes.We
further assume that the technology investment costs thefirmon theorder
of $1,000,000.
Table 4 illustrates the trade-offs managers must make between the
risks they face and the profit-at-risk associated with the customer
information security technology investment. We observe that a new
technology investment that reduces the likelihood during the period
of a major customer information security breach to 5% (the middle
column in the table) yields a higher expected profit in comparison to
the alternative that caps the number of records lost at 1,000,000, with
the associated financial losses. In contrast though, the second
alternative – the investment that caps the loss of customer data
records – yields a higher profit-at-risk (PaR). Interestingly, both of
these investments would be considered “efficient” according to the
Inefficient Protection Interval Proposition (P1): so neither investment
choice dominates the other. Managers then must decide, based on
their own risk tolerance, which investment is more attractive. Our
illustration suggests that this may not always be the profit-
maximizing investment, which is in line with the theory we have
put forward.
5. Analysis
We next analyze information security investments under alterna-
tive circumstances: (1) when there is selective adoption and
underestimation of risk; (2) when regulations or standards are
implemented; and (3) when a firm is able to pass on implementation
costs to its customers. A firm's information security investment level
reflects its managers' boundedly-rational understanding about the
known sources of threats.
Fig. 4. Financial loss distribution for customer information security breaches.
Table 4
Three simulated scenarios for information security investments analyzed with a value-at-risk model.
Value-at-risk model parameters Baseline scenario before an addition
technology investment
Technology investment diminishes
expected frequency of breach
Technology investment diminishes
expected loss severity
Probability of one information security
breach in the quarter involving all
the firm's customers' data records
10% 5% 10%
Loss severity distribution Unaffected Unaffected Financial losses diminished by an information
security technology investment that caps the
firm's security breach to include no more than
1,000,000 records, which diminishes the loss severity
Expected financial losses
(for the quarter)
$343,826 $162,560 $178,740
Value-at-risk (maximum loss at
a 98% confidence level)
$1,576,756 $1,497,726 $1,001,715
Expected profit $4,656,174 $4,837,440 $4,821,260
Profit-at-risk (PaR) $3,423,244 $3,502,274 $3,998,285
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5.1. Moral hazard, selective adoption and underestimation of risk
In the base case, we assumed every customer has homogeneous
perceptions about the value of privacy protection. Sowe only considered
their concerns about how well privacy protection works on average.
There is a wide spectrum of attitudes among customers though. Some
value privacy more, no matter what improvements in a firm's services
are offered. Others, by the same token, may disclose their private
information even though they express concerns about privacy [8]. Prior
studies have shown that if consumers believe their information is safe,
they may be reckless in their behavior [10]. For example, they may
choose poor passwords, or leave their homewireless networks insecure.
This is a form of moral hazard, and is endemic to insurance markets
[29,41] and settings involving principals and agents [18]. Some
customers might choose not to take advantage of the protection
mechanisms that a firm provides, either because they are ignorant of
information security risks, or because they simply don't want to be
bothered by using those solutions. For example, customers who have a
slow Internet connection might refuse to use protection mechanisms
that would slow their transactions.
Moreover, the information security-enhancing technologies that a
firm chooses to offer to its customers may not be as effective as
expected. Because of differences in customer preferences for
technology, not all customers will wish or have time to adopt all
such technologies. The Fair Information Practices guidelines recom-
mend that firms provide opt-out choices to their customers when
collecting unnecessary personal information for transactions. In this
case, even if a firm provides opt-out choices, customers who do not
choose to opt out might still face some risks. Thus, the overall risk
associated with a firm's consumer information security issues might
not be as controlled as customers expect.
Likewise, some protection methods may be incompatible with
customers' computer operating systems or software and hardware set-
ups. Some privacy-enhancing technology solutions require software to be
installed. Protection solutions written with ActiveX controls cannot be
installed onMac or Linux systems, for example. So those solutions would
not protect customers who have systems that run OSX or Linux. Such
limitations might shift the loss function associated with customer
information security breach and loss severity risks as a result [40].
Now, let us revisit the information security optimizationproblem. (See
Fig. 5.) If the solutions a firm decides to implement do not protect all its
customers, then theeffects of thefirm's effects to control anddiminish risk
for its customers will be smaller than might be expected, but its
implementation costs would remain the same. Thus, we propose:
• Proposition 3 (Underestimation of risk). Due to a lack of technical
capacity or differences in preferences, not all customers will adopt the
information security protection mechanisms suggested by a firm,
resulting in the protectionmechanisms being less effective than expected.
As a result, the estimated risk will be less than the actual risk, and such
under-estimation will result in a lower protection level.
The difference between the maximum profit and maximum PaR is
derived from the presence of the severity of loss distribution z(S, α).
Under-estimating the risk that is present will reflect a belief that there
is a smaller variance in x, thus reducing the efficient protection
interval. Fig. 5 shows an example with a smaller variance in x.
Compare this to Fig. 3, the base case. The efficient interval is narrower
with a smaller variance in x. Though S⁎ does not change, Sˆ is lower in
Fig. 5 than in Fig. 3. So underestimating the anticipated risk level will
result in a lower customer information security protection level, with
less of an investment in technology that is made.
5.2. Self-regulation versus government regulation
The efficacy of two different approaches, self-regulation and govern-
ment regulation, has been a subject of debate for some time [11].
Government regulations force firms to follow strict rules when handling
the sensitive personal information of their customers, and require the
implementation of different policies and privacy-enhancing technologies.
In many cases, government regulations are accompanied by severe
penalties for failure to comply. In the U.S., for example, state and federal
legislatures have passed many regulations that impose civil or criminal
penalties for the failure to protect consumer privacy. Although the
regulations offer detailed privacy protection guidelines, they are
sometimes either too broad in their context of application and do not
consider specific industries' characteristics, or not specific enough to be
Fig. 5. The effects of under-estimation of the risk of an information security breach.
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enforceable [39]. Because of growing concerns about consumers' privacy
and an increase in the number of privacy regulations in the U.S. economy,
however, firms are increasingly expected tomaintain higher standards of
online privacy.
On the other hand, self-regulation policies impose no penalties;
instead, firms can use them as guidelines to help reduce the risk of
misuse to a reasonable level when fully adopted. But self-regulation is
not always feasible, and firms will act to self-regulate only within the
bounds of their limited resources. Studies that treat these issues
suggest that it is not enough to adhere to self-regulation because firms
typically will choose to adopt the level of privacy protection that suits
their own circumstance, rather than the needs of their customers [37].
Because self-regulation does not force full adoption of the guidelines,
most countries use government regulations to set the minimum level
of protection, even if they still encourage self-regulation in practice.
Next, let us revisit our information security protection interval analysis
results with this broader discussion in mind. First, we will assume that
only government regulation exists, and examine several different cases
(See Fig. 6).
5.2.1. Case I: Government regulation for information security protection
that is insufficient
If the level of government regulation is at the left inefficient interval,
both profit and PaR increase as S increases, and there is always a better
information security investment choice available which will maximize
profit and PaR. Thus, any firm would choose a customer information
security protection level above the level the government sets. In this case,
then, the government's regulations will be ineffective.
5.2.2. Case II: Government regulations enforce information security
protection inside the efficient interval
What if the government regulations enforce the minimum level of
information security protection inside the efficient interval? Firms that
comply with those regulations would choose to set their information
security protection level between the minimum level set by the
government and PaR. Thus, those government regulations will narrow
the efficient protection interval, effectively increasing the minimum
information security protection level, so that customers overall are better
protected. Firms that take riskswould expect lower profits. Depending on
thepenalty that accompanies these regulations, however, somefirmsmay
choose to set their information security protection level below the
government's regulations to maximize their profit. To prevent this from
happening, the regulations should impose a penalty that is greater than or
equal to the firms' expected gain in profit. If the minimum level of
protection is set adequately, and is accompanied by a proper penalty, then
regulation will increase the protection level for consumers, which will
decrease the risk of privacybreaches,while still allowingfirms togenerate
reasonable profits as they remain on the efficient interval.
5.2.3. Case III: Government regulation sets a privacy protection above the
level consistent with PaR
The last case is where the level of information security protection
set by the government exceeds the protection level at PaR. The
information security protection level at PaR is defined as the level that
will maximize profit while controlling most of the possible risks
associated with information security breaches, excluding some
extreme cases. In other words, at PaR, most of the probable causes
of information security breaches will have been addressed. Beyond
that level, implementation costs will exceed the costs of the risk that
the firm faces; thus the firm will have no reason to go beyond this
point. From the security perspective of customers alone, more
information security is preferred and full protection is beneficial.
The reality, however, is different. From an economic standpoint,
efficient information security protection might mean less-than-best
or full protection.7 Firms must consider the implementation costs, as
well as the costs associated with the risk. We have seen that the costs
Fig. 6. Effects of government regulation on firm profit from information security investments.
7 It is appropriate for us to comment on another situation in which personal
information privacy regulations by the government might require firms to invest
above PaR to protect their customers, even though we have not sought to model this.
In cases where national security interests are an issue, the government might insist on
full protection as a means of addressing the most extreme cases that are possible [22].
Full information security protection investment levels might be inefficient from an
economic perspective, but this would be in the national interest and justifiable
because of the risks association with cyber-penetration into a defense contractor
systems, for example. Social welfare interests dominate efficiency in expectational
terms. We have recently seen indications of the severe risks that are present due to the
increasing capacity of China-based Internet attackers, and their ability to mimic U.S.
Department of the Air Force and other defense community memoranda [15].
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outweigh the benefits at some specific point S⁎ in the analysis. Thus, if
the level of information security protection that the regulations
enforce is in this region, it might seem that customers will be well-
protected; but in reality, little is gained because the additional
protection will only cover rare and extreme cases. Regulations that
require this level of protection only sacrifice firm profit if they are
enforced. Thus, from a financial economics perspective, there is no
reason for the government's regulations to go beyond the protection
level above the information security level that is established in
connection with PaR. We now offer two additional propositions:
• Proposition 4 (Proper penalty for government regulation). To
encourage firms to follow the regulations for information security
protection, the penalty imposed under the regulation should be at least
equal to the difference between themaximumprofit level and the profit at
the desired level of information security protection.
• Proposition 5 (Effective interval for government regulation).
To be effective, the level of government regulation should be within
the efficient protection interval, which is between the level of
information security protection that yields the maximum profit and
that which yields the maximum PaR.
Now, consider the role of self-regulation. Unlike government
regulations, which are accompanied by appropriate penalties for
enforcement in most cases, self-regulation has no specific means of
enforcement. Thus, an information security protection level suggested
by self-regulation set below government regulations has practical
meaning. Similarly, a level of information security beyond PaR is
inefficient from both the government regulation and self-regulation
standpoints. As a result, the effective region for self-regulation lies
above the government's regulation level, and below the level at PaR.
However, self-regulation tends to provide enough information
security protection to cover the most probable causes of the security
breaches, so it can serve as a “reasonable”maximum protection level.
So we argue that the most effective self-regulation will be a level of
information security protection that is equal to the protection level at
PaR. Interestingly, this finding agreeswith prior empirical research [2],
which shows that most firms do not implement plans to achieve
full privacy protection, even though we cannot ascertain from the
data alone that the observed patterns of firm information security
investments are due tofirms' efforts to optimize their investments.We
propose:
• Proposition 6 (Effective interval for self-regulation). To be
effective, the selected level of self-regulation should be greater than
the level of government regulation within the efficient protection
interval, preferably at the level of PaR.
5.3. Recovering investment costs by passing them on to customers
Competitive conditions in some parts of the marketplace may
permit a firm to pass the costs of protecting customers' information
security on to the customers' themselves. For example, some banks
ask customers to purchase an authentication certificate to indicate
their earnestness andwillingness to divulge their identities in order to
permit them to use the banks' online payment services. We wrote
earlier of a keychain device that PayPal sells to its members, and that
this is an example of a firm that is passing the costs of information
security on to its customers. Many justifications for investing in
information security-enhancing technologies have been suggested.
Most studies, however, relate the protection of people's privacy to
building trust and reputation [40]. This is an incomplete view based
on how we have conceptualized this problem — there are some
important economic relationships that need to be sketched.
To maintain profitability while properly protecting customer
information security, a firm may wish to pass on its implementation
costs to its customers by increasing its prices. We will assume that
there is no diminution in demand based on the change in prices
associatedwith the costs of additional information security protection
that the firm offers, which is reasonable in the short run because
customers are able to obtain additional insurance that their personal
information will remain private. A price increase may even enable a
firm to offer a higher level of protection than it did before, charge
more than before, and engender more trust and a stronger reputation
Fig. 7. Pass-on of 50% of implementation costs for information security investments.
915Y.J. Lee et al. / Decision Support Systems 51 (2011) 904–920
in the market than it had before. Instead though, our modeling
approach is to limit the benefit from the price premium to investment
cost recovery rather than as ameans to build higher revenues.Wewill
discuss this limitation further when we conclude.
Consider two scenarios. The first occurs when a firm passes on
some of the implementation costs of enhanced information security to
its customers. Fig. 7 shows the changes in PaR and profit when the
firm can recover 50% of the information security implementation costs
from its customers. A second scenario is to pass 100% of those costs on
to customers, as shown in Fig. 8.
Let us compare Figs. 7 and 8 to our base case in Fig. 3. Note that
Fig. 8 shows the case in which a firm passes all of its implementation
costs on to its customers at the point of maximum profit and
maximum profit-at-risk; this is S=1, or full investment. Thus, the firm
incurs no losses or additional costs for implementing this level of
information security. Further note that, even at the 50% investment
level as shown in Fig. 8, the efficient protection interval is right-
shifted so that S→1.
From the above discussion, we propose:
• Proposition 7 (Pass-on of implementation cost effect). When
possible, passing on the implementation costs for privacy protection
to a firm's customers will increase information security protection at
both the minimum and maximum level for the efficient protection
interval.
Another related observation is that the efficient protection interval
will start out higher than in the base case, and will be narrower, too.
This is because the firm suffers less from the costs associated with
providing protection services. However, it is important to keep in
mind that the amount of implementation costs that a firm can pass on
to its customers without diminishing their demand will be limited
beyond some price premium level. Even if customers don't figure this
out right away, they will figure it out eventually, and so the price
elasticity of their demand will be useful to consider. If the
implementation costs are large, and the price premium from added
trust and enhanced reputation that can be charged in the market is
small, then the firm will be unable to pass all of the implementation
costs on to its customers.
6. Discussion
We next will offer some clarifications about the boundary
conditions of the model we have proposed. We also seek to highlight
some of the applications that will be most beneficial to firms and
consumers. We will discuss where these risk management techniques
should not be used, and the potential dangers that may accompany
misuse. We first discuss some issues with the technical assumptions
of the model, as a basis for providing full disclosure on what we know
about the approach we have developed.
6.1. On the assumptions and boundary conditions for the model
Our model assumes that the loss distributions can be estimated in
terms of both loss severity and breach frequency. Managers must have
some point of historical reference tomake estimates in quantitative or
qualitative terms about the loss distribution. Wang et al. [45]
proposed a value-at-risk model for financial information services.
They utilized historical data to simulate event frequencies, and made
managerial estimates of the potential losses. The key take-away from
their work is that the approachwill only be as sound as the robustness
of the estimation of the underlying loss severity and frequency
distributions. Moreover, any implementation of this model should be
subject to frequent testing and checking to see whether the parameter
assumptions are in synch with the evolution of the risks of loss in the
related managerial environment.
A value-at-risk model can be tested and validated by back-testing, a
process that involves the systematic comparison of historical PaR
measures with the subsequent returns [23]. Given the confidence level
α, one can test such amodel by counting howmany times the actual loss
exceeds the model's PaR, after counting the number of exceptions in the
total sample size.When the total sample size is large enough, a standard t-
test can be applied to derive Type I error for rejecting a correct model or
Type II error for accepting an incorrect model. To validate the model, one
should consider both error types. Even if the Type I error is low, a high
Type II error will mean that the model's accuracy can be improved by
increasing the confidence level. A manager can then adjust the model
according to previous data. In addition to providing information on the
model's accuracy, back-testingmay also provide useful information about
Fig. 8. Pass-on of 100% of implementation costs for information security investments.
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thefirm'sdata collection initiatives. Thiswill helpmanagers tounderstand
better the domain towhich this approach is best suited, andwhatmetrics
provide the most effective decision support.
In the analysis, we assumed continuous normal distributionswith “fat
tails” for the loss function. In reality, it's not clear whether this will be the
case. However, as long as the probability distribution shrinks as
technology investments S increase, our model will produce valid results
with any other distributional assumptions. This assumption is reasonable
because there is no need to implement information security protection
mechanisms that do not diminish the risks associated with information
securitybreach-related losses. Further, ourmodeldoesnot require the loss
function to be continuous. In the case of a discrete loss function—which
may be all that is possible to estimate, a manager can consider using
percentiles instead of confidence levels (at the 95th percentile instead of
the 95% confidence level) when applying the model. Each discrete case
should be compared separately to find the optimal PaR, and the optimal
PaR then shouldbe comparedwith themaximumprofit level for accuracy.
6.2. Consumer preferences, managerial strategies and public
policy perspectives
One of the central questions we examined in this article is who
pays for information security protection. The consumer may have
strong preferences to protect their personal information, and may be
on the lookout for opportunities to transact with firms that offer
information security services that create better protection. Consumers
are likely to have some expectation of privacy, and thus all sellers will
be forced to make investments in information security as a “cost of
doing business.” On the Internet today especially, a firm will not be
able to operate effectively in themarketwithout doing this. In the end,
consumers will foot the bill, but an interesting question arises as to
whether a firmwill be able to obtain competitive advantage or to reap
extra profits through information security investments.
Anecdotal evidence shows that there are companies whose entire
business models are centered on information security services for other
firms. Thesefirms, such as Lifelock (www.lifelock.com), TrustedID (www.
trustedid.com) and Identity Guard (www.identityguard.com), specialize
in identity theft protection. It is clear that they employ technologies to
reduce the risk of customer identity theft, but they also offer some
interesting financial remedies in the event that an intrusion occurs, and
customers' personal information is lost. For example, LifeLock touts a
$1 million dollar guarantee to cover certain expenses associated with an
individual's identity theft. Most of these services also offer tiered-pricing
with different technologies that enhance information security, and
different levels of remedies. The technical services often involve
notification, which serves to ensure that a participant is informed in a
timely manner that there has been some form of identity theft.
It still is unclearwhat thebase level of information security is thatmost
consumers expect, and beyond that, what more they might be willing to
pay for. Our earlier example of PayPal's decision to foist upon consumers
the perceived need to further protect intrusion into their PayPal accounts
through the application of a code-generating keychain device for which
theymust pay is a case in point. Indeed, the spectrumof different offerings
and pay-for-harm remedies associated with identity theft bears this out.
Although we have demonstrated a modeling mechanism in this research
to deal with suchmanagerial choice problems, the problem, nevertheless,
may be best addressed by the formation of public policy related to it.
Similar to other settings inwhich insurance policies need to be evaluated,
consumers may not be able to accurately assess the value of protecting
theirprivatepersonal information. Firms, then,mayhave little incentive to
provide the means to protect consumers, and the resulting under-
investment in protection of personal information may lead to an overall
loss of welfare to society. Although self-regulation is often attractive, we
questionwhether it will work in this instance. Instead, it maymakemore
sense for government policy-makers to be the pivotal agents who are
charged with figuring out what value of social welfare gains will
accompany the balancing of costs, risks and expected financial loss
trade-offs that we modeled.
6.3. Black swan risks
Another aspect of the problem we have studied that is worthy of
further consideration involves the classes of risks that cannotbeestimated
or predicted with accuracy. Such risks may be characterized as “black
swan” events, as the popular business risks writer Nassim Taleb [43] calls
them. They include such thingsas the September11, 2001 terrorist attacks
on the World Trade Center in New York City, and the likelihood of an
earthquake in San Francisco, California or Seattle, Washington of the
magnitude that occurred in Haiti in January 2010. In the context of
information securitybreaches, there are alsoanalogous “black swan” risks,
and they fall outside the risk boundaries and analytical capacity of our
model. Managers should be aware of this, and perhaps should look to
other kinds of extreme value analysis fromeconomics, risk and insurance.
We do not wish to argue, however, that firms cannot invest in
technologies that will provide risk indemnification against “black swan”
events. In fact, the record shows that many financial firms located in the
World Trade Centers were able to recover their systems after the 9/11
attacks due to prior investments in disaster recovery services [42], and the
loss of customer information in the process was never a major issue. One
cannot predict the frequency or magnitude of these events related to
information security losses with any real accuracy though. Thus, it will be
hard to develop any kind of meaningful empirical data to formulate
appropriate loss distributions that would permit an analyst to use our
modeling approach for the “black swan” class of customer information
security risks. Instead, we advocate amuch simpler approach: subsuming
the risks of extraordinary disaster into amodel that calibrates the impacts
of loss distributions for themore-frequently encountered risks thatmight
be present at the 1% likelihood level — but nothing less.
7. Conclusion
We developed a model based on current theoretical perspectives
in financial risk management to analyze how information security
investments result in tradeoffs between expected financial losses and
the firm's risk mitigation efforts on behalf of its customers. Our model
has the potential for real-world application in a variety of scenarios
where information security breach frequency and financial loss
severity distributions can be estimated qualitatively or quantitatively.
In addition to our contributions in this research, we also highlight
several limitations of our modeling approach that will help informa-
tion security managers and information privacy theorists to gauge its
range of application and potential effectiveness.
7.1. Contributions
Ourmain contribution is tomodel the information security investment
decision-making process using operational risk management and value-
at-risk methods in financial economics that support a profit-at-risk
approach to evaluate the optimality of firm-level decisions to protect the
personal information of customers. It is well known that there is a trade-
off between security costs anddesirable levels of information security, but
little work has been done to analyze the risk-return trade-offs for
information security enhancement investments. Even though the
probability of an information security breach may be low for most
firms, the associated risk still may be quite high because of potentially
extreme losses. Thus, firms will need to invest in information security
services to reduce their exposure to these risks. It is unclear howmuch a
firm should invest though. Spending too much will cause an undue
financial burden, while spending too little will expose the firm to
unpredictable and unacceptable losses. We addressed this issue, and
provided an in-depth analysis of the dynamics of information security
investments with analytical methods from financial risk management.
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Our model can be implemented in a real-world decision support
system, because the underlying analytical methods can be readily
represented and embedded in risk analysis routines that can guide
information security investments. As such amodel is tested, managers
will see the benefits of gathering customer information security-
related data, and sharing it among firms— in much the sameway that
we see benchmarks that have been created for risk management in
commercial lending and financial services, IT outsourcing and services
contracts, and other settings. This also will inform information
security professionals' efforts to develop new metrics to improve
their internal controls.
We have shown that optimal investment decisions for information
security protection depend on the tradeoff between the cost to
implement the information security service and the concomitant risk
mitigation that is achieved. Practitioners may benefit from our model,
since it is directly applicable in operational settings and business
processes for which customer information security is an issue. By
applying reasonable values to each attribute, it is possible to come up
with approximations of the investment choices that will be effective
for the firm. The profit-at-risk method allows the assignment of a
confidence interval that the manager thinks appropriate. Managers
also can test the effects of small changes in each attribute by perform-
ing sensitivity analysis on the model's elements. This approach will
add richness to the analysis process to justify the necessary tech-
nology investments to enhance information security for customers.
We have also shown that there is a minimum information security
protection level that the firmwill need to achieve to make its investment
in customer privacy protection effective. We called this the inefficient
protection interval, and within it a firm incurs higher costs of implemen-
tation and operations relative to the associated risk reduction that the
information security protection services provide.
Due to the ambiguity in understanding what constitutes effective
privacy protection, many firms tend to under-estimate the risks.
When a manager believes that the risk is likely to be low, the firm will
invest less. Another factor that affects the investment level is the cost
of implementing and operating the protection. Our model confirms
that the lower the concern about risk, then the optimal value of profit-
at-risk, PaR, will occur at a lower level of customer information
security protection. This implies that proper evaluation of expected
risk is necessary to set the confidence level associated with security
breaches.
Our model also confirms why firms do not fully invest in customer
information security protection. The risks that companies and their
customers face with changing technology developments include
intentional attacks on private customer information, and changing
levels of effectiveness of firm-level information security. It is likely
that a firm's and its customers' personal information may not be
completely secure, even if the firm invests fully in relevant in-
formation security. Thus, investing to achieve the maximum level of
protection often is not an optimal strategy. Firms are better off when
they consider maximizing profit-at-risk instead, and then they should
invest in protection accordingly, albeit at a lower level than fully.
One way to manage profitability in the presence of information
security investments is for the firm to pass all or some of its security-
related implementation and operational costs on to its customers.
Although this is rarely the first thing that most managers think about
– just as it is not the first thing we have considered in our base model
for customer information security investments – it is a necessary
consideration in today's marketplace. Consumers are likely to be
willing to pay for this protection to some degree, so this is worthwhile
for managers to explore. Our model shows that firms should provide
more information security when they share the costs of information
protection investments with their customers. This may not always be
true, of course. Other factors, such as high price competition, price
elasticity of market demand, and so on, should be considered during
the decision-making process. We have only scratched the surface of
the complex issues that need to be modeled and evaluated in greater
depth.
7.2. Limitations
We conclude by pointing out some caveats and limitations. In our
model, all of the information security protection services areweighted
equally. Adding any services will incur the same proportional costs.
Only the quantity of services matters in the model that we have
specified. Some service elements, in reality, may not cost the same
amount though. Examples include the provision of payment services
using secure third-party payment methods, opt-out choices on
promotional mailing lists, and opt-out choices to preclude the
retention of customers' private information used during transactions.
Different kinds of protection will cause the firm to incur different
implementation costs. For the analysis we have conducted, this issue
does not affect our results. Our model deals with the average costs
that are incurred with information security protection technology
investments. It will only be implementation costs which deviate
significantly from average costs that will affect our policy recommen-
dations and results.
A second limitation is that we have assumed there is not an
endogenous relationship between the extent of a firm's investments
in information security on behalf of its customers and the possibility
that such investments promote new demand-driven revenue from
consumers. Instead, we focused only on variations in the severity and
frequency of information security breaches. Future research should
explore what will happen with changes in consumer demand for a
firm's products or services if it gains an increasingly strong reputation
with respect to the protection of customer information privacy, while
its competitors may be less successful. Finally, our model relies on
estimates of the frequency and magnitude of future losses. We expect
firms to build predictive models based on historical data to estimate
future losses when customer information is compromised. Third-
party firms that provide security benchmarks, auditors, and standards
bodies may be good sources of such data.
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Appendix 1. Proof of propositions
A. Proof of Proposition 1 (Inefficient protection interval)
Let S⁎=argmax(π) and Sˆ=argmax(PaR). From Eq. (3), we know that
PaR(Sˆ)bπ(S⁎). We assume that dλ(S)/dSb0, dz(S,α)/dSb0 and dC(S)/
dSN0.We further assume that π and PaR are continuous, so thefirst-order
condition for π(S⁎) is dC(S⁎)/dS⁎=−dλ(S⁎)/dS⁎, and the first-order
condition for PaR(Sˆ) is dC(Sˆ)/dSˆ=−dz(Sˆ,α)/dSˆ. By definition, dλ(S)/
dSbdz(S,α)/dS. Also, since dC(S)/dSN0, S⁎bSˆ. Therefore, dC(S⁎)/dSbdC
(Sˆ)/dS. To satisfy the condition dπ/dS/dPaR/dSN0, it is necessary that dπ/
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dSN0 and dPaR/dSN0 (Case A-1) must hold, or that dπ/dSb0 and dPaR/
dSb0 (Case A-2) must hold.
Case A-1. dπ/dSN0 and dPaR/dSN0
Since PaR(Sˆ)bπ(S⁎), the interval which satisfies the conditions dπ/
dSN0 and dPaR/dSN0 is [0, S⁎]. Within [0, S⁎], max(π) is at S⁎ since dπ/
dSN0, andmax(PaR) is also at S⁎ since dPaR/dSN0. Therefore, for any point
S+ within [0, S⁎], π(S⁎)Nπ(S+) and PaR(S⁎)NPaR(S+).
Case A-2. dπ/dSb0 and dPaR/dSb0
Since PaR(Sˆ)bπ(S⁎), the interval that satisfies both dπ/dSb0 and
dPaR/dSb0 is [Sˆ, 1].Within [Sˆ, 1],max(π)will be at Sˆ since dπ/dSb0, and
max(PaR) also will be at Sˆ since dPaR/dSb0. Therefore, for any point S+
within [Sˆ, 1], we know that π(Sˆ)Nπ(S+) and PaR(Sˆ)NPaR(S+). □
B. Proof of Proposition 2 (Efficient protection interval)
We assume that both dπ/dS and dPaR/dS are decreasing and
continuous. Also, from Eq. (3), we know that PaR(Sˆ)bπ(S⁎), where Sˆ
and S⁎ are the points where PaR and π are maximized. To satisfy the
condition (dπ/dS)/(dPaR/dS)b0, dπ/dS and dPaR/dS must be dπ/dSb0
and dPaR/dSN0. Since PaR(Sˆ)bπ(S⁎), the interval which satisfies both
dπ/dSb0 and dPaR/dSN0 is [S⁎, Sˆ]. Within [S⁎, Sˆ],max(π) will occur at
S⁎ since dπ/dSb0, andmax(PaR) will occur at Sˆ since dPaR/dSN0. Thus,
at any point S+ within [S⁎, Sˆ], π(S⁎)Nπ(S+) and PaR(Sˆ)bPaR(S+).
Thus, investments in customer information protection at level S
within [S⁎, Sˆ] will be subject to tradeoffs between π and PaR. □
C. Proof of Proposition 3 (Under-estimation of risk)
Let xUE be the information security loss severity distribution x for
under-estimation (UnderEst), πUnderEst be the profit associated for
under-estimation, and Sˆ the protection level S which maximizes PaR.
The level of profit will remain the same as in the base case. This is
because under-estimation only affects the severity of the total
financial loss distribution, z(S, α). Thus, max(π)=max(πUnderEst).
However, since dz/dSb0, dzUnderEst/dSb0, and with dz/dSbdzUnderEst/
dS from Eq. (1), it also will be the case that dPaR/dSbdPaRUnderEst/dS.
Therefore, SUnderEst=argmax(PaR)bSˆ. □
D. Proof of Proposition 4 (Proper penalty for government regulation)
Let us assume that government regulation (GovReg) requires some
minimum information security protection level SGovReg, with
S⁎bSGovRegbSˆ. Since dπ/dSb0 and PaR(S)bπ(S) within the efficient
protection interval (from the proof of Proposition 2), π(S*)Nπ(SGovReg)N
PaR(SGovReg). Thus, in order to enforce the government's regulation
effectively, the penalty associated with the regulation should be greater
than π(S*)–π(SGovReg). For the case of 0bSGovRegbS⁎ and SˆbSGovRegb1, see
Proposition 5's proof. □
E. Proof of Proposition 5 (Effective interval for government
regulation)
Case E-1. 0bSGovRegbS⁎
Since dπ/dSN0 within this interval, π(S*)Nπ(SGovReg). Thus, govern-
ment regulation in this interval will be ineffective.
Case E-2. Sˆ b SGovReg b 1
Since dPaR/dSb0 within this interval, PaR(Sˆ)NPaR(SGovReg). Note
that PaR(Sˆ) is the maximum profit for the worst-case outcome. Let ε
be the probability of an information security breach at SGovReg, where
the confidence interval for PaR (α) is less than ε. From the first-order
condition, PaR(Sˆ)–PaR(SGovReg)Nz(S, α)–z(SGovReg, ε) since dPaR/dSb0
within [Sˆ, SGovReg]. Thus, government regulation in this interval also
will not be effective. □
F. Proof of Proposition 6 (Effective interval for self-regulation)
Let SSelfReg be the minimum level of information security protection
that self-regulation SelfReg requires. Since self-regulation is not associated
with any penalty, if SSelfRegbSGovReg, only government regulation GovReg
will be effective. Thus SSelfReg must be greater than SGovReg. For the case of
SˆbSSelfRegb1, see proof of Proposition 5. □
G. Proof of Proposition 7 (Pass-on implementation cost effect)
Although we retain the assumption from Eq. (2) that the firm's
revenue R is constant based on the quality of the information security
offered to consumers, we include the firm's cost recovery of its
technology investment by permitting the firm to charge a higher cost
recovery-inclusive price. We capture such passed-on costs (PassOn) to
customers in our analysis by rewriting revenue R inclusive of passed-on
costs as RPassOn. We further note that RPassOn(S) will be increasing in S
(dRPassOn(S)/dSN0). Since πPassOn (S)/dS=π(S)/dS+dRPassOn(S)/dS, then
π(S)/dSbπPassOn(S)/dS. Similarly, we know that PaR(S)/dSbPaRPassOn(S)/
dS. Therefore, argmax(π)bargmax(πPassOn) and argmax(PaR)bargmax
(PaRPassOn). □
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